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Introduction
The Second IMO GHG Study 2009 
of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) on greenhouse gases (GHG) in the shipping sector presented two important insights. First, the shipping sector contributed about 3.3% to global GHG emissions in 2007, which is more than what was assumed before. 1 Second, the shipping sector's CO 2 emissions are projected to increase significantly in the coming decades if its emissions remain unregulated . The consequence would be that in the next decades the shipping sector's CO 2 emissions would constitute a considerable proportion of the maximum allowed emissions, i.e., the maximum emissions that are in line with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) 2°C target (UNEP, 2011) . Thus, other sectors would have to emit less and reduce their emissions further to offset the increase in shipping emissions.
This has led to discussions on how to regulate the shipping sector's CO 2 emissions, discussions which are continuing not only in the IMO, but also in the scientific community.
These discussions center around the question whether this sector should be subject to an emission cap or whether it should be subject to some other means of reducing emissions (UNEP, 2011) . Progress was made when the IMO agreed on two mandatory efficiency measures to reduce CO 2 emissions from shipping in July 2011, (MEPC, 2011) : the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), which is exclusively for newly built ships, and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). Market-based policies for the shipping sector are also being discussed and investigated (MEPC, 2010) .
While there is some literature on the pros and cons of different allocation options to allocate shipping emissions to countries and on their effects for specific country groups (den Elzen et al., 2007 , Gilbert and Bows, 2012 , Heitmann und Khalilian, 2011 , Wang, 2010 and some literature on technical abatement potentials and the costs of different measures derive a decision criterion for regulating CO 2 emissions in the shipping sector that is in line with the 2°C target. Yet, the importance of regulating CO 2 emissions in the shipping sector can only be assessed, when the potential cost savings are known. Also, how CO 2 emissions should be regulated depends on what the efficient contribution of the shipping sector actually is. In this paper, we thus want to address these issues.
From a methodological point of view, the problem is that global top-down economy-climate models or integrated assessment models (IAMs) that are able to analyze the cost efficient contributions of various sectors do not or do not explicitly include the shipping sector.
Another approach, which is less sophisticated and simpler, to include the shipping sector is using marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) (see Criqui et al., 1999, Ellerman and Decaux, 1998) . This approach is mostly used to analyze the impacts of international emissions trading at the country level (see, e.g., Ellerman and Decaux, 1998 , den Elzen et al., 2005 , Löschel and Zhang, 2002 , Rickels et al., 2012 , but can also be used to calculate sectoral contributions to emission reductions. While using MACCs has some drawbacks and results have to be treated with care (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012 , Kesicki and Strachan, 2011 , Klepper and Peterson, 2006 , MACCs can nevertheless provide an indication of the cost effective contributions of various nations/sectors to emission reductions.
The information on abatement costs and potentials that is available for the shipping sector is a few expert-based MACC studies that have been published recently , Eide et al. 2011 , Faber et al. 2011a , and Faber et al., 2009 ). We use this information to generate a global MACC for the shipping sector that can be combined with a MACC for conventional CO 2 abatement in the production and consumption sectors around the world. We then use these two MACCs to assess for various global reduction targets: (a)
the maximum global cost savings that could be achieved by emission abatement in the shipping sector, (b) the cost efficient abatement contributions of the shipping sector to the global reduction targets, and (c) the potential additional costs that would be incurred by implementing a separate solution for the shipping sector. We focus on the year 2020.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on the shipping sector, gives an overview of existing MACC studies, and discusses the methodological challenges that arise when using an expert-based cost assessment in combination with MACCs generated by a top-down model. The main challenge is how to treat the negative abatement costs that are found in the MACC studies of the shipping sector.
We discuss how these negative abatement costs can be interpreted and suggest three different approaches to deal with them in our context. , Eide et al., 2011 , Faber et al., 2011a , and Faber et al., 2009 . Table 1 presents an overview of the assumptions made in these studies and results for the year 2020, the year we focus on in our analysis.
3 Table 1 : Overview of expert-based MACCs: assumptions and results a In Faber et al. (2011a) , the baseline is not given explicitly (central estimate 436 Mt are 33% of the baseline in 2020 and 340 Mt are 26% of the baseline in 2020).
Source: Own presentation based on Buhaug et al. (2009 ), Eide et al. (2011 ), and Faber et al (2011a .
The MACC estimates shown in Table 1 have in common that the maximum abatement potential of the world fleet is large (about 15% -40% relative to business-as-usual (BAU) 3 Faber et al. (2009) (Eide et al., 2011 , Faber et al., 2011a , or between 20%-26% of projected emissions in 2020.
Data is often not available on the costs and abatement potentials of abatement measures.
Therefore, the MACC studies include only measures for which costs and abatement potential estimates exist (e.g., Faber et al., 2011a . Some measures may be mutually exclusive, which also has to be taken into account when generating the abatement cost curves from these data (Faber et al., 2011a) . This fact also allows the generated curves to be interpreted as MACCs, which they are not in the narrower sense, since they only calculate the average cost per ton abated and not of the marginal (last) ton abated.
The MACC studies often differentiate between several categories of abatement measures, which differ from each other in terms of, e.g., costs and implementation, see Faber et al. (2011a) Source: Own presentation based on Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. (2011a) . 4 This number represents the central estimate of cost-effective potential (<0$/t) in Buhaug et al. (2009 Operational measures mainly concern the operation and maintenance of ships and are characterized by low investment and moderate operating costs, and low abatement potential.
An example for such a measure is the implementation of a system that improves routing, i.e., to avoid unfavorable conditions that cause unnecessary fuel consumption. The measure reduces fuel costs and CO 2 emissions, but incurs investment costs to buy and implement the system and it incurs operating costs to maintain and manage the system. Technical measures mainly concern technical design features of ships and are characterized by high investment and moderate operating costs. An example for such a measure is the implementation of a waste heat recovery system that can be used to generate electricity alternatively to auxiliary engines and thus reduce fuel consumption (Faber et al., 2011a . Structural changes mainly concern the improvement of common practice, e.g., charter contracts or port efficiency, with regard to energy efficiency. Alternative fuels/power sources mainly concern substitutes, e.g., liquefied natural gas for motive power, for the use of carbon-intensive fuels.
Both categories of measure types are characterized by high abatement potential, but at the same time are limited in application, e.g., because there is a lack of mature infrastructure for liquefied natural gas, or are difficult to develop (Eide et al., 2011 , Faber et al., 2011a . Faber et al. (2011a Faber et al. ( , 2010 Nevertheless, they might be able to decide whether or not to apply/implement operational measures, but this depends on the contract between the owner and the other actors . However, both technical and operational measures are mostly subject to the issue of split incentives (ICCT, 2011 ) and this distinction is crucial for constructing our own set of MACCs for the shipping sector and, in particular, for how we treat negative abatement costs.
Negative abatement costs
One problem with expert-based MACCs is the existence of negative abatement costs. 5 In contrast, MACCs generated by models (bottom-up partial-equilibrium models and top-down CGE models) by construction generate only positive abatement costs. The assumption in all models is that rational individuals implement abatement measures that have negative costs even in the absence of climate policy, whereas they implement abatement measures that have positive abatement costs only if climate policy gives rise to a price on CO 2 emissions.
However, the question arises why such abatement measures (that have negative abatement costs), which often represent established, nonrisky technological or operational measures, are not embraced by the market participants. Various studies have tried to explain the existence of negative abatement costs in expert-based MACC estimates in general (IPCC, 2007, Kesicki and Ekins, 2012) . Their main explanation is that expert-based MACCs are mostly based on a very narrow cost definition, namely project costs that ignore potential additional costs. The project costs are the costs of an individual abatement option that is assumed to have no significant indirect economic impacts on markets and prices. Of the potential additional costs that are ignored, those that stem from barriers to implementation are, in particular, important for the shipping sector. Several such barriers are presented in the shipping-specific literature (Eide et al., 2011 , Faber et al., 2011a , ICCT, 2011 ). Faber et al. (2011b find four important reasons for nonadoption of cost-effective measures: low priority of energy-efficiency improvements, split incentives 6 between the owner of a ship and a charterer, transaction costs to collect relevant information about energy-efficiency 5 See, e.g., the very popular abatement cost curves published by McKinsey (Enkvist et al., 2010) .
6 Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argue that if the actor who invests in an efficiency-improving measure is not the same actor as the actor who benefits, implementation is unlikely. Investment will occur only, if the investor gets the investment recovered by the beneficiary of the efficiency-improving measure. In case of the shipping sector, this issue concerns the relationship between the ship owner and the charterer.
improvement measures, and the possibility of time lags between the implementation of measures and the measures becoming cost-effective. Here, the issue of split incentives is that the ship owner bears the investment costs of an abatement measure (e.g., main engine retrofit), whereas the operator/charterer receives the benefits in terms of reductions in operating costs (e.g., less fuel consumption) . Eide et al. (2011) stress in particular that the issue of split incentives between ship owners and charterers can, to a certain degree, explain the nonadoption of cost-effective measures. Generally, Faber et al. (2011b) argue that the main barriers are of a technical, financial, and structural/institutional nature.
Understanding the barriers to implementation is important in order to design effective regulation. Some barriers may be overcome by having price signals, whereas others may be overcome by enacting laws.
We follow Hyman et al. (2002) to deal with negative abatement costs in expert-based MACCs. They propose two approaches to approximate a function based on an underlying engineering estimate of marginal abatement costs.
The first approach is to assume that no-regret options, i.e., measures that reduce emissions at negative net costs (IPCC, 2001), are not economical when accounting for all relevant costs and to shift up the MACC so that it lies above the horizontal axis. The second approach is to assume that all no-regret options are undertaken, even in the absence of any climate policy.
Thus, only the positive part of the MACC, i.e., the reduction potential at positive marginal abatement costs (MACs), is relevant. Here, the negative part of the MACC needs to be subtracted from the baseline emissions, where the reduction potentials of these measures, i.e., the measures that have negative abatement costs, are not taken into account yet. The first approach implicitly assumes that the barriers to implementation or extra cost are relevant for the implementation of all measures, also for the ones with positive abatement costs. Since it assumes that the level of the extra costs is exactly the level of the measure with the highest negative costs, it uses, in some sense, a lower bound estimate for the extra costs. It thus tends to overestimate the size of the contribution of the shipping sector to emission reductions. The second approach underestimates total global CO 2 emissions in the business-as-usual (BAU) or reference scenario without any emission reduction measures, since not all of the measures with negative abatement costs may actually be undertaken, and at the same time it underestimates the size of the contribution of the shipping sector to emission reductions, since some of the measures with negative abatement costs may be implemented only with the extra incentives of carbon prices. For this reason, we add a third approach to those of Hyman et al. (2002) that deals with the issue of barriers to implementation. The third approach is to assume that measures are subject to barriers to implementation, in particular, to the issue of split incentives, which is an apparent phenomena in the shipping sector. We assume that the issue of barriers to implementation is more pronounced for some measures than for others because some of the measures are already employed by a significant proportion of the world fleet according to ICCT (2011) . 7 We thus assume that all no-regrets measures for which the issue of barriers to implementation is less pronounced are undertaken, arguing that these would nevertheless be implemented by the actors who have control over such measures and at the same time bear the fuel costs. These measures are thus not considered in the MACC as is done in the second approach. 8 We further assume, when accounting for all relevant costs that all no-regret measures for which the issue of barriers to implementation is pronounced are assumed to be not economical. The MACC is thus shifted up, so that costs lie above the horizontal axis as in the first approach. This implies that costs associated with abatement measures that have positive abatement costs that are subject to the split incentives issue are also shifted up.
It is difficult to tell which of these approaches is most realistic. We clearly believe that there are barriers to implementation that have some kind of shadow price. Thus, we consider the first and third approaches to be realistic, whereas we consider the second approach to be rather academic. Although we acknowledge that shifting up the MACC by exactly the level of measure with the highest negative costs is an arbitrary choice, we nevertheless, consider the first approach to be best suited as our central case.
Generating MACCs and MAC functions
We follow the methodology presented in Eide et al. (2011 ) and Faber et al. (2011a )/Wang et al. (2010 in order to generate customized MACCs of the shipping sector. This methodology includes, in general, a projection of the fleet development, the determination of a business-asusual (BAU) emissions scenario, i.e., determining the amount of CO 2 emissions that would be emitted if no abatement measures were taken in a given year, and the calculation of CO 2 reduction potential and corresponding costs per measure and ship for a given year.
The MACC is obtained by ordering the costs in increasing order and then plotting them against their corresponding reduction potentials.
We assume that abatement efforts in the shipping sector start in 2020, i.e., ships first start to implement abatement measures from 2020 onwards. This assumption is based on the given condition that ships currently have no incentives, despite the two mandatory efficiency measures EEDI and SEEMP, to implement abatement measures.
Based on this assumption, we first project the world fleet composition in 2020 based on the current world fleet composition and ship-type-specific growth and scrapping rates. We use data from SeaWeb (IHS Fairplay, 2012) in order to determine the current world fleet composition, i.e., the number of ships per ship-type/ship-age category, whereby a ship type is subdivided into various ship segments. 9 These categories (subcategories) correspond to the categories in Buhaug et al. (2009) , but since we work with data on abatement measures from Wang et al. (2010) , the world fleet under consideration here consists of 14 major ship types that are divided into 53 size segments instead of 18 ship types and 70 segments, as in Buhaug et al. (2009) . 10 We use ship-type specific growth and scrapping rates from Eide et al. (2011) in order to project the current fleet up to 2020. This means we first allocate ships of the current fleet into ship-segment/ship-age categories, which gives us the total number of ships per segment and the number per ship-segment/ship-age category. Then, we apply the growth and scrapping rates to the total number of ships in the ship segment. We add the number of new ships to the new age category, category 1, whereupon the former age category 1 becomes age category 2, and subtract the number of scrapped ships from the last age categories. As in Wang et al. (2010) the age category ranges from 1 to 30 years. For simplicity, we treat those few ships older than 30 years that we find in the current age distribution of the world fleet the same as 30-year-old ships. In other words, abatement measures only have an effective duration of one year when applied to such ships, thus, causing high abatement costs.
We determine the baseline CO 2 emissions of the world fleet as projected to 2020 by following Eide et al. (2011) The data on abatement measures from Wang et al. (2010) include high and low estimates of recurring (investment) and annual nonrecurring (operating and maintenance) costs, and fuel reduction (and thus CO 2 emissions abatement 11 ) potentials for 22 measures and 14 major ship types. In addition, an effective duration (in years) is assigned to each measure, e.g., a waste heat recovery system has an effective duration of 8 years, whereas a solar energy system an effective duration of 30 years (SNAME et al., 2010) . Because some of the measures are mutually exclusive, they are grouped into 15 groups in order to avoid overestimating abatement potentials , ICCT, 2011 . 12 Moreover, the individual reduction effects and corresponding CO 2 emission abatement achieved by all the measures that could be implemented simultaneously on a ship are calculated first and then ordered according to their abatement costs per ton of CO 2 (increasing order). The measure with the lowest abatement cost is selected and assumed to be applied first. Its emission reduction is calculated based on a ship's pre-installation fuel consumption and the individual reduction effect. Then, the individual reduction effects and abatement costs of all the remaining measures are recalculated. The fuel reduction potential of the second applied measure is calculated based 11 The assumed conversion factor is 3.13.
12 The 15 groups consist of the following measures: operational speed reduction, weather routing, autopilot adjustment, propeller maintenance, hull cleaning, hull coating, optimization water flow of hull openings, air lubrication, propulsion upgrade, main engine adjustment, waste heat recovery, wind power, solar power, low energy lightning, and speed control of pumps and fans (see Faber et al. (2011a and ICCT (2011) for more details).
on the reduced fuel consumption resulting from the first applied measure (Eide et al., 2011 and Faber et al., 2011a .
We apply the same calculation approach as presented in Eide et al. (2009) 
Total costs C t depend on the nonrecurring (investment costs) and annual costs (operating costs). We analyze two scenarios to cover the extremes: one that assumes high reduction potentials and low costs (hrlc) and one that assumes low reduction potentials and high costs (lrhc) of abatement measures. As Figure 2 shows, the difference between these two scenarios is mainly the amount of abatement potential at negative abatement costs and the level of these negative costs. The positive part of both curves is rather similar. How to treat the negative abatement costs it is thus very important. In this respect, we apply the three different approaches discussed in section 2.2:
The Table 3 . 15 The model results in cases full_rp and reduced_rp show a more moderate increase in marginal abatement costs per reduction potential in the beginning than in case barrier_rp. The latter case shows that a negligible share of the maximum reduction potential is available at very low marginal abatement costs (roughly -220 US$/t), which causes a jump in the beginning of the MACC. We eliminated that negligible share of the maximum reduction potential from the MACC (0.2% of reduction potential) because it would cause the shift-up of the MACC to be distorted. Instead, we shifted-up the MACC by using the constant 200. The three cases (full_rp, reduced_rp, and barrier_rp) differ in terms of maximum reduction potential and marginal abatement costs. The case full_rp always has the highest maximum reduction potential, followed by case barrier_rp and case reduced _rp. The maximum reduction potential in the lrhc scenario is less than 50% of that in the hrlc scenario. The share of maximum reduction potential that has negative (marginal abatement) costs is significant and amounts to about 90% in both scenarios. This is also apparent from the MACCs presented previous studies, the fuel price is assumed to be higher as of 2020 and onwards, causing lower (marginal) abatement costs. 16 The maximum reduction potential of the case barrier_rp is less than that of the original MACC (70% in the hrlc scenario and 85% in the lrhc scenario) because specific measures are excluded a priori, so that their reduction potential is no longer available (we assume, rather, that it is already included in the BAU emissions). Moreover, it is apparent from the figures that the negative part of the MACC is more affected than the positive part of the MACC by the different reduction potentials/costs estimates. ( )
where R refers to emission reductions, i refers to cases (1) full_rp, (2) reduced_rp, and (3) barrier_rp, and j refers to (1) the hrlc scenario and (2) the lrhc scenario.
The parameters (a ij ,b ij , and c ij ), the R 2 (adjusted R 2 ), and function plots are presented in Table   A1 and in Figures A1-A6 in the Appendix.
Combining the shipping MACC with a global MACC

Construction of a CGE-model-based global MACC
We use the DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) CGE model, which is currently calibrated to the GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) , to generate a global MACC for abatement measures used outside the shipping sector in 2020. The DART model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy designed for the analysis of international climate policies. For a more detailed description of the model see Klepper et al. (2003) . The MACC contains options to reduce fossil fuel use, and thus to reduce CO 2 emissions, in all production and consumptions sectors of the world economy.
17
The shipping sector is not included in the DART model.
18
The MACC of the DART sectors, which we denote in the following as all other sectors (AoS), is generated by implementing a harmonized global carbon tax of different levels in all model regions and then plotting the tax level, the carbon price, against the abatement (compared to a BAU emissions scenario without any climate policy or carbon price). To set up our partial 17 The production sectors are represented by coal, refined oil, gas, chemical products, electricity, agriculture, crude oil, transport, energy intensive sectors, other light industries, other heavy industries, and services. The consumption sector is represented by a representative household per region. MACC-based model, we again tested several functional forms to fit a continuous function to the MACC (see Figure A7 and A8 in the Appendix). Since it turns out in our scenario analysis that optimal abatement outside the shipping sector is always between 7,000 Mt CO 2 and 10,500 Mt CO 2 (see Section 4.2), we decided to use the quadratic form.
( ) 
with R 2 = 0.999008.
Discussion of combining both curves
We aim to obtain an idea of what amount of emission reduction in the shipping sector would constitute an efficient contribution to achieving the global reduction target. To do this, we make use of the least cost theorem (see, e.g., Perman et al., 1999) and combine both MACCs.
We suppose that both AoS and shipping (S), have to achieve a given joint emission target, A.
When both of them reduce their BAU emissions, E i , by the amount R i , the sum of individual emissions reductions thus needs to fulfil the overall condition . In both sectors, the optimal amount of emission reduction, R i *, needs to be determined so that the sum of abatement costs is minimized. The optimization problem becomes:
The optimization problem is, in general, solved by first setting up the first-order conditions 19 and second by solving the resulting equations simultaneously, which results in the marginal abatement costs being equal to the shadow price, p*, (tax or permit price) of the emission constraint (=target) over both sectors:
We are aware that the combination of both MACCs is in fact not entirely consistent because they are different by construction. The calculation of mitigation costs is based on a project- 19 We obtain the marginal abatement costs functions directly from the MACC analysis.
level analysis in the shipping framework, whereas the calculation is based on a macroeconomic analysis in the DART model. The former analysis assumes that the implementation of individual (abatement) measures do not affect prices and markets indirectly, whereas the latter analysis takes into account general equilibrium effects of climate policies that affect prices and markets. However, the impact of abatement measures in the shipping sector on prices and markets can be assumed to be small and thus the inaccuracy of combining both
MACCs should be rather small as well.
Analysis of different emission reduction and climate policy scenarios
Description of scenarios
Before we describe the emission reduction and policy scenarios for our analysis, we need to Now we can proceed to describe the emission reduction scenarios, of which there are three, each of which differ in terms of the assumed global reduction requirements. In the first scenario, the global reduction requirement is determined by the 2°C target, which was acknowledged by the Copenhagen Accord and the G8 summit. In the other two scenarios, the global reduction requirement is determined by the Copenhagen Pledges, which consist of an unconditional (CP low) and conditional (CP high) pledge scenario. These pledges are national reduction pledges for 2020, which have been submitted by many Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries to the UNFCCC in the context of the Copenhagen meeting (UNFCCC, 2010a,b,c) and which are the only targets -though nonbinding -that exist.
Concerning the 2°C target, the UNEP report (UNEP, 2010) respectively, 48.536 GtCO 2 (hrlc) and 48.749 GtCO 2 (lrhc) in case reduced_rp, in the high pledges scenario. Again, we then multiply these targets by 0.556 to obtain a target for CO 2 emissions only and finally subtract aviation emissions. Table 4 shows the BAU emissions, emission targets, and implied reduction targets for our different scenarios. Source: den Elzen et al. (2011 ), UNEP (2010 , IEA (2009a) , and own calculations.
The aim of our analysis is to assess for three different global reduction targets (a) the maximum global cost savings that could be achieved by emission abatement in the shipping sector, (b) the cost efficient abatement contributions of the shipping sector to the global reduction targets, and (c) the potential additional costs that would be incurred by implementing a separate solution for the shipping sector. We base our analysis on two alternative policy scenarios. One policy scenario assumes that AoS and shipping have a joint target, i.e., both sectors contribute (efficiently) to the joint overall reduction target (joint target scenario). The other policy scenario assumes that AoS has to bear the full reduction burden, while the shipping sector remains unregulated (AoS without shipping scenario).
Comparing both scenarios indicates the potential gains that could be achieved by including the shipping sector in climate policy on CO 2 emission reductions.
Results
We start by discussing the results of the policy scenario joint target (these results are also summarized in Table 5 ) and thereafter discuss the results of the comparison between the policy scenario joint target and policy scenario AoS without shipping.
The CO 2 prices range, depending on the case analyzed and assumed reduction potentials/ costs scenario (hrlc and lrhc), between $53.5 and $56.8 under the 2°C target, between $34.5 and $35.7 under the low Copenhagen Pledges, and between $38.7 and $39.9 under the high Copenhagen Pledges. CO 2 prices are always higher in the lrhc scenario than in the hrlc scenario because it has a smaller reduction potential and higher cost per abated ton of CO 2 .
CO 2 prices are always the lowest in case reduced_rp, independent of the assumed reduction potentials/costs scenario (hrlc or lrhc), because the BAU emissions in cases full_rp and barrier_rp are higher than in case reduced_rp, causing higher reduction needs. The efficient contribution of shipping to overall reductions varies between 0.1% and 2.2%
under the 2°C target, between 0.1% and 2.4% under the low Copenhagen Pledges, and between 0.1% and 2.3% under the high Copenhagen Pledges. It is the highest in case full_rp, followed by case barrier_rp and case reduced_rp in the hrlc scenario (see Figure 3a) . The reason for this is that the MACCs of cases full_rp and barrier_rp have higher maximum reduction potentials and are less steep in the beginning than in case reduced_rp (see Figure   A9 in the Appendix). The picture is different in the lrhc scenario. The efficient contribution of shipping to overall reductions is the highest in case barrier_rp (except under the low Copenhagen Pledges scenario), followed by case full_rp and case reduced_rp in the lrhc scenario (see Figure 3b) . Here, the MACCs of cases full_rp and reduced_rp are steeper in the beginning, but start at a lower cost level than case barrier_rp (see Figure A9 in the Appendix). Moreover, the lower the overall reduction target (CP low < CP high < 2°C), the higher the efficient contribution of shipping to the overall target in cases full_rp and reduced_rp in both of the reduction potentials and costs scenarios (hrlc and lrhc) assumed. This is caused by the quadratic functional form of the approximated MAC functions. The opposite, i.e., the lower the overall reduction target (CP low < CP high < 2°C), the lower the efficient contribution of shipping to the overall target, is true for case barrier_rp. This is caused by the linear functional form of the approximated MAC functions. 
Discussion
Our results show that the shipping sector could always contribute to efficient global emission reductions and that this contribution could always achieve global cost savings. However, the contribution of the shipping sector to efficient global emission reductions and the potential cost savings depend to a large degree on the MACC case assumed, i.e., depend on how the existence of negative abatement costs is treated in a MACC, and on the reduction potentials and costs of measures assumed.
If we are generally optimistic about reduction potentials and costs (hrlc scenario), the contribution and potential cost savings are significant in the case with the highest maximum reduction potential (full_rp), almost negligible in the case with the smallest maximum reduction potential (reduced_rp), and small in the case with the moderate maximum reduction potential (barrier_rp). The reasons for this are obviously that in case barrier_rp, fewer measures are taken into account and in case reduced_rp, a huge share of the maximum reduction potential (the reduction potential at negative costs) is assumed to be achieved even in the absence of climate policy, so that this reduction potential no longer contributes to cost savings when regulating the shipping sector. Thus, only a small share of the maximum reduction potential remains. However, it is difficult to say which of the cases resulting from the approaches presented in Section 2.2 is most realistic. We clearly believe that there are barriers to implementation that have some kind of shadow price so that we see the second approach as rather academic. Therefore, its corresponding case (reduced_rp), the one with the smallest maximum reduction potential, seems to be less realistic than the other two cases because it assumes that all reduction potentials at negative costs will be implemented, i.e., that there are no barriers to implementation or extra costs, whereas both cases, full_rp and barrier_rp, assume that barriers to implementation or extra costs exist. However, the case barrier_rp might underestimate the reduction potential by excluding measures from the MACC analysis that are assumed to be already used by a significant share of the world fleet.
The opposite might be true for case full_rp by assuming that all the analyzed measures are not being used yet. Moreover, shifting up the MACC by exactly the level of the measure with the highest negative costs involves making an arbitrary choice. Extra costs could be even higher (or lower), affecting the contribution of shipping to efficient abatement. Nevertheless, we suggest that the case with the highest maximum reduction potential (full_rp) should be considered the most realistic one.
If we are generally pessimistic about reduction potentials and costs (lrhc scenario) the general picture is different. Now global cost savings are almost negligible (in the order of less than 0.5%) and there is no significant difference between cases full_rp and barrier_rp.
Comparing the two reduction potential and costs scenarios (hrlc/lrhc) shows that the difference between the maximum reduction potentials is large, the difference between the marginal abatement costs is not so obvious (see Figure 2a and . 20 Our calculations show that this target is close to the cost minimizing reduction level when assuming high reduction potentials and low costs (hrlc scenario) and the full reduction potential (full_rp). When we compare to this target our targets implied by the Copenhagen pledges, we find that there is in this case a perfect match, while we find in the case of the 2°C target that the optimal reduction target in the shipping sector would be about 25%. Under these assumptions, requiring the same relative reductions in the shipping sector and AoS is thus almost cost efficient. Under all other assumptions (low abatement potentials and higher costs -i.e., all lrhc scenarios and all reduced_rp and barrier_rp scenarios), the relative reduction target for the shipping sector that is cost minimizing is much lower than 20% and mostly in the order of a 1 -5% reduction only.
A comparison to the other studies (see Table 1 ) shows that the shipping sector's cost-effective reduction potential becomes considerably smaller when treating the existence of negative marginal abatement costs as a calculation artifact caused by the narrow cost definition of project-level analysis (our scenarios full_rp and barrier_rp). According to Eide et al. (2011) , emission reductions in the order of between 27% and 31% relative to BAU emissions could be achieved in 2020 if a decision criterion (marginal cost threshold) of <20US$/t, <50US$/t, respectively, were to be applied. These emission reductions include not only reductions that have positive costs, but also the ones that have negative costs. We, on the other hand, found that (efficient) emission reductions amounts to 19% relative to BAU emissions in the most optimistic scenario (full_rp/hrlc) and to only 1% in the most pessimistic case (reduced_rp/lrhc) under the low Copenhagen Pledges (~35US$/t).
Conclusion
While it is clear that emissions generated by the shipping sector are substantial and can be reduced, at least partially, at low costs it has not been analyzed so far how much emissions should actually be reduced when the objective is to reach a given global emission target at minimal costs. In this paper, we have thus determined whether the shipping sector could contribute to reducing global emissions efficiently to reach certain global emission targets under different policy scenarios by making use of marginal abatement cost curves (MACC).
We have presented an approach to deal with the existence of negative abatement costs in the expert-based MACC generated for the shipping sector in order to combine it with a CGE model-based MACC generated for abatement measures used outside the shipping sector. We focus on the year 2020.
The main findings are that the shipping sector could always contribute to efficient global emission reductions and thus could always achieve global cost savings. Yet, the optimal contribution and the possible cost savings depend much on the MACC case assumed, i.e., depend on how the existence of negative abatement costs in a MACC is treated, and the assumed reduction potentials and costs of measures. Under optimistic assumptions about the use of abatement measures, the shipping sector can reduce costs by 3.5%, while under less optimistic assumptions it can only reduce costs by less 1%.
Yet, it is important to point out that we did not have data for the reduction potentials and costs of all possible abatement measures in the shipping sector and also since we only included 14 ship types, representing only a part of the world fleet, although this part is significant in terms of transported tonnage. This implies that the reduction potential might increase when more measures and more ship types are included in the analysis.
Overall, we thus conclude that emissions generated in the shipping sector should be regulated in order to prevent emissions generated by the shipping sector from consuming a considerable share of allowed emissions in the coming decades and to prevent other sectors from having to compensate by exploiting more expensive abatement options. Since there is uncertainty about what the optimal reduction level in the shipping sector would be, an approach that allows equalization of marginal abatement costs in the shipping sector and other sectors (such as including the shipping sector in an emission trading scheme or applying a carbon tax at a level of prices in existing emission trading schemes) is preferable to isolated regulation of the shipping sector. Figure 7 shows three approximated functions for AoS. As the figure shows, the quadratic form (gray dashed line: bx+cx 2 ) has a better fit than the other quadratic (black dashed line: cx 2 ) and the exponential form (black dotted-dashed line: Exp(a+bx)) for abatement levels between 7,000 and 10,500 MtCO 2 . 
